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(1997, 1999) between “targeting rules” and “instru-
ment rules.” Is there, in fact, a major difference? Or
can targeting-rule outcomes be closely approximated
by instrument-rule procedures? Third, in the context
of optimal policy-rule analysis, issues concerning
operationality—stressed by McCallum and Nelson
(1999)—arise naturally. Is the superiority of rule-
based over discretionary policymaking enhanced
or diminished by realistic specification of informa-
tion available to the policymaker? Finally, how
important is this newly emphasized dynamic loss
compared with that from the more familiar inflation-
ary bias that arises from discretionary policymaking?
In exploring these issues, we begin with an
exposition of the basic analysis that emphasizes
Woodford’s concept of a “timeless perspective”
monetary policy and its relationship to previous
concepts of rule-based policymaking.
BASIC ANALYSIS
As an illustrative framework, we begin with the
forward-looking macroeconomic model that is used
by Woodford (1999, 2000) and also is a special case
of the models in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (CGG)
(1999) and Jensen (2002).1 This simplest version
features only a forward-looking price adjustment
or aggregate supply relation of the Calvo type, aug-
mented with shocks that keep the current natural-rate
level of output from being economically efficient.2
Below, in addition, we consider a more general
1 The latter two papers permit first-order autoregressive processes for
the shock variables, which make their systems somewhat richer than
that considered by Woodford, and also consider model variants that
include lagged inflation and output-gap terms.
2 For some discussion of the nature of the ut shock in equation (1), see
Woodford (1999, 2000), CGG (1999, pp. 1566-67), Erceg, Henderson,
and Levin (2000), and Giannoni (2000).
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ecent analyses by Clarida, Galí, and
Gertler (1999), Jensen (2002), Svensson
and Woodford (2004), Walsh (2003), and
especially Woodford (1999, 2000, 2003) have been
highly productive in advancing the profession’s
understanding of monetary policy that is intended
to be optimal. Specifically, these papers emphasize
the importance, for policy purposes, of the distinc-
tion between macroeconomic models (of private
behavior) that are “forward looking”—i.e., have
equations that include expectations of future values
of endogenous variables—and those that are not.
This distinction—applied to the structural form of
the model—is of great theoretical significance, since
models derived from optimizing analysis almost
invariably include expectations of future variables.
A major point of the cited literature is that there
is, in forward-looking models, an inefficiency that
results from discretionary policymaking, relative
to that of a well-designed policy rule, that obtains
in addition to the familiar inflationary bias. (The
inflationary bias has been extensively discussed
in a huge literature that typically uses non-forward-
looking models.) This “dynamic loss” arising from
discretionary monetary policy, which is implicit in
earlier work by Currie and Levine (1993) among
others, has been valuably emphasized in the cited
papers, especially Woodford (1999).
There are many associated issues, nevertheless,
that remain to be considered. One of these is the
quantitative extent to which a policy rule of the type
in question provides improved outcomes relative to
(optimal) discretionary behavior. That magnitude
depends, of course, on the model employed—its
parameter values and general aspects of the specifi-
cation. An exploration of these features is clearly
warranted. A second and related topic, moreover,
concerns the distinction proposed by Svensson
MARCH/APRIL 2004      43
Bennett T. McCallum is the H.J. Heinz professor of economics at Carnegie Mellon University and a research associate of the National Bureau of
Economic Research. Edward Nelson is a research officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and research affiliate of the Centre for Economic
Policy Research. The authors thank James Bullard, Robert Dittmar, William Gavin, Mark Gertler, Christian Jensen, Douglas Laxton, Andre Minella,
Jón Steinsson, Lars Svensson, Carl Walsh, Alex Wolman, and Michael Woodford for helpful discussion and comments. Jason J. Buol provided research
assistance.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, March/April 2004, 86(2), pp. 43-56.
© 2004, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
 McCallum and Nelson REVIEW
44 MARCH/APRIL 2004
relation that, although less clean theoretically, yields
implications that some analysts (e.g., Fuhrer, 1997)
consider to be more realistic empirically. Denoting
inflation (relative to its steady-state value) in period
t by πt, and the output gap by yt, the basic relation
is the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC):
(1)                    πt=αyt+βEtπt+1+ut, 
where α>0, 0<β<1, and ut is the shock term.3
For simplicity, we initially assume that the process
generating ut is white noise. The model that we (and
the cited authors) have in mind actually also includes
an optimizing IS-type demand relationship of the
form
(2)     yt=Etyt+1+b1(Rt – Etπt+1)+vt,          b1<0 
where Rt is the central bank’s interest rate instru-
ment and vt is a preference or government spending
shock.4 But we shall at first pretend that the central
bank can directly control πt as an instrument—an
assumption that is very common in the literature
and is innocuous in the present context.5 We will
later extend the analysis in a manner that involves
inclusion of equation (2) and use of an interest rate
instrument.
The central bank’s objective function at time t
is taken to be of the form




2),          ω>0 
which Woodford (2003) has shown to be consistent
with individual optimality in terms of agents’ prefer-
ences under certain reasonable conditions.6,7 Con-
sequently, the central bank’s problem at some point
in time, here taken (without loss of generality) to
be t=1, can be expressed as minimization of the
Lagrangian expression






+βλ 2(αy2+βπ3+u2 – π2)+...] 
with respect to π1, π2, ..., and y1, y2, ...8 As shown
by Woodford (1999) and CGG (1999), under policy
commitment the optimizing conditions include
(5a)             2ωyt+ αλt=0,          t=1, 2, ... 
(5b)        2πt+λt – 1 – λt=0,          t=2, 3, ...
(5c)                            2π1 – λ1=0. 
Here equations (1), (5a), (5b), and (5c) apparently
determine optimal values of πt, yt, and λt for period
t=1 and planned values as of t=1 for periods
t=2, 3, ... But these choices entail dynamic incon-
sistency, since the central bank could re-solve the
problem in period 2 and would then choose 2π2 –
λ2=0 instead of the condition 2π2+λ1 – λ2=0 that
is suggested by (5b). Thus the standard commitment
solution, in which the central bank implements (5a),
(5b), and (5c),9 views the central bank as selecting
values in t=2, 3, … that it currently considers
undesirable from the perspective of its own decision-
making process. Since such a pattern of behavior
seems highly implausible, this type of commitment
solution does not provide an attractive equilibrium
concept.
There is another equilibrium concept, however,
involving a different type of commitment, that is
much more attractive—as Woodford (1999) argues
convincingly. Instead of using (1), (5a), and (5b)
together with the start-up condition (5c) to determine
paths of πt, yt, and λt for t=1, 2, …, the central bank
can use (1), (5a), and (5b) without any start-up con-
dition by applying (5b) in all periods. This approach,
which Woodford terms the “timeless perspective,”
involves ignoring the conditions that prevail at the
regime’s inception—say, by imagining that the
decision to apply (5a) and (5b) had been made in
the distant past. In this case, there is no dynamic
inconsistency in terms of the central bank’s own
decisionmaking process. Specifically, if there is no
8 In (4), the terms Etπt+1 from (1) can be written without Et operators
because E1Etπt+1=E1πt+1, by the law of iterated expectations.
9 When period t+j comes around, the central bank can by assumption
observe yt+j and πt+j, so it can implement (5a)-(5b) exactly.
3 The coefficient β in (1) represents the private sector’s discount factor.
Since its value is smaller than 1.0, equation (1) would imply that the
Phillips curve is not of the accelerationist type if πt were defined as
inflation. With our interpretation, that implication does not prevail,
however. This point has recently been mentioned by Svensson and
Woodford (2004).
4 Because we have written (2) in terms of the output gap—a somewhat
undesirable practice, as the IS relationship fundamentally pertains to
aggregate demand, not the output gap—the vt term also includes the
expected change in the log of the natural rate of output.
5 If the relation (2) is included as an additional constraint, with optimiza-
tion then conducted with respect to Rt as well as yt and πt, the Lagrange
multiplier attached to this constraint equals zero for all t.
6 The model that Woodford uses to derive this welfare function has no
ut disturbance in the Phillips curve (1). Giannoni (2000) provides a
rationalization for the ut term that would continue to imply the
objective (3).
7 Note that we are using the same discount factor in both (1) and (3).
Below we briefly mention an implication of differing values.
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change in the central bank’s model, then the relation-
ships between π2 and y2 chosen by this process in
period 2 agree with the relationship planned in
period 1.
An alternative description of this mode of policy
behavior can be obtained by specifying that the
analyst’s concern is with macroeconomic perform-
ance within and across regimes, not with transitions
from one regime to another. In this case, the analysis
specifies that the policy regime has been in effect
long enough that effects of the particular initial
conditions, which obtained at the time of its incep-
tion, have become negligible. This is the conception
adopted by Lucas (1980, p. 205), Taylor (1979, p.
1278), and others. Our contention is that this is the
most appropriate presumption for monetary policy
analysis. To us it seems implausible that, following
a policy regime change, private agents could imme-
diately begin forming expectations consistent with
the new regime. The basic rational expectations
approach requires that a policy regime has been in
effect long enough for private agents to understand
it and believe in its continuation.
It is perhaps worth mentioning that this timeless-
perspective type of policy behavior agrees in spirit
with what has been viewed by most analysts, since
publication of Barro and Gordon’s (1983) exposi-
tion of the Kydland and Prescott (1977) insights, as
“policymaking according to a rule.” The various
quotes in Woodford (1999) taken from McCallum
(1999a) illustrate that agreement,10 as does
Woodford’s placement of his analysis in a section
of his (1999) paper entitled “Rule-Based Policy-
making.” The modification that King and Wolman
(1999, pp. 374-75) make to the commitment case,
in their study of optimal monetary policy, also cor-
responds to adoption of a timeless perspective.11 It
is also worth emphasizing that many studies of
optimal monetary policy in forward-looking models
have considered policies that are labeled “commit-
ment,” but which (because these policies ignore
the period 1 first-order condition and use only the
remaining portion of the commitment conditions)
should really be regarded as reflecting timeless
perspective policy. Recent examples in this last
category of studies include CGG (1999) and Batini
and Nelson (2001). 
For comparison, we need to derive the counter-
part of conditions (5a)-(5c) provided by “discre-
tionary” policymaking, i.e., a process that presumes
period-by-period reoptimization involving each
period’s start-up conditions. In this case the deriva-
tives with respect to the terms in the Lagrangian
expression (4) that correspond to Etπt+1 in (1) are
all equal to zero.12 Thus the counterpart of (5b)
becomes
(6)                  2πt – λt=0,          t=1, 2, … 
which is similar to the first-period condition (5c) in
the commitment optimization, but now applies to
each period. Note that discretion can be character-
ized by the absence of the lagged Lagrange multi-
plier in the central bank’s first-order condition, as
stressed by Woodford (2003, Chap. 7).
In addition, let us express the policy-optimality
conditions with the Lagrange multipliers λt substi-
tuted out. Then, for the discretionary optimum, we
obtain from (6) and (5a) the following:
(7)                              πt=–(ω/α)yt. 
By contrast, the timeless-perspective, rule-based
condition implied by (5b) and (5a) is
(8)                       πt=–(ω/α)(yt – yt –1). 
The latter expression is equivalent to (8) or (7) in
Woodford (1999) and to (4.18) of CGG (1999). It is
of some interest to note that in the special case
ω=α, and with constant potential output growth,
the timeless-perspective rule (8) calls for nominal
income growth targeting. This point is related to
the findings reported by Jensen (2002) and Walsh
(2003).
Quite recently, it has been recognized that use
of (8) in all periods, as proposed by CGG (1999) and
Woodford (1999), is not optimal within the class of
time-invariant policy rules. Specifically, there is a
slightly different rule that generates superior results
on average, i.e., that yields a smaller unconditional
expectation of the conditional expectation in (3).13
Analysis conducted to date suggests, however, that
the welfare improvements are not substantially great.
12 The reason is somewhat more complex than in the Barro-Gordon
(1983) model, which is not forward looking: see Woodford (1999, pp.
308-9) or CGG (1999, p. 1672).
13 See Jensen and McCallum (2002), Jensen (2001), and Blake (2001).
These papers indicate that optimality requires that (8) be altered to
πt=–(ω/α) (yt – βyt–1). If private-sector and central-bank discount
factors differ, it is the private-sector value that appears in this latter
expression.
10 See, for example, Woodford’s (1999) footnote 22.
11 King and Wolman’s (1999) modification is patterned after an analo-
gous procedure in Kydland and Prescott’s (1980) study of optimal tax
policy.
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In any event, these results do not negate interest in
comparisons between the Woodford-CGG timeless-
perspective results and those based on discretionary
behavior.
Equilibrium Behavior in the Basic Model
To determine how inflation and the output gap
behave in the timeless-perspective equilibrium, we
obtain the rational expectations solution to the model
consisting of the policy rule (8) and the private
behavioral relation (1). In particular, we look for the
minimal state variable (MSV) solution that excludes
bubbles and sunspots, as discussed by McCallum
(1999b). Thus we conjecture that πtand ytare related
to the clearly relevant state variables yt –1 and ut as
follows:
(9a)                     πt= φ11 yt –1+φ12ut
(9b)                     yt=φ21 yt –1+φ22ut. 
Then Etπt+1=φ11(φ21 yt –1+φ22ut) and substitution
into (1) and (8) yields the undetermined-coefficient
relationships:
(10a)                    φ11=αφ21+ βφ11φ21
(10b)                φ12=αφ22+ βφ11φ22+1 
(10c)                    φ11=(ω/α)(1 – φ21) 
(10d)                        φ21=–(ω/α)φ22. 
From (10a) and (10c), we find that φ21 satisfies 
(11)                       βφ21
2 – γφ21+1=0, 
where γ=(1+β+α
2/ω). The relevant root, according
to both the stability and MSV criteria, is
(12)                 φ21=[γ – (γ
2 – 4β)
0.5]/2β, 
which satisfies 0<φ21<1. Following CGG (1999),
we use the symbol δ=φ21. Then the values for φ11,
φ12, and φ22 can be found to be φ11=(ω/α)(1 – δ),
φ12=1/(γ – βδ), and φ22=–(α/ω)/(γ – βδ), and the
solutions are
(13)        πt=(ω/α)(1 – δ)yt –1+(γ – βδ)
–1ut
and
(14)             yt=δyt –1 – [(α/ω)/(γ – βδ)]ut. 
These can be shown, with some tedious algebra, to
agree with solution expressions reported by CGG
(1999, e.g., their equation (8.1)).14
Finally, to find the MSV equilibrium under dis-
cretionary optimal policy, we use (7) rather than (8)
as the policy rule. In a system consisting of (1) and
(7), there are no clearly relevant state variables other
than ut, so we conjecture a solution of the form
(15)                                πt=φ1ut
(16)                                yt=φ2ut. 
Then Etπt+1=0 and the values of φ1 and φ2 are
found to be ω/(ω+α
2) and –α/(ω+α
2), respectively.
Neither Woodford (1999) nor CGG (1999)
includes an analysis of the relative losses—the
unconditional expectations of the objective func-
tion—under the two modes of policymaking. Indeed,
they do not actually put forth any claim that the
timeless-perspective losses are generally smaller
than those from discretionary policymaking.15 We
do not attempt any general algebraic analysis here,
but proceed by examining the issue quantitatively
using calibrated models with specific parameter
values varied over fairly wide but realistic intervals.
Such an analysis is included in the next section.16
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Our agenda now is to specify values for the
model’s parameters α, β, and ω; find the rational
expectations solutions described above; and report,
for a range of values for the variances and serial
correlation of ut, the average values of the loss
function. The average values of the intertemporal
loss function (3) are proportional to the mean of
the instantaneous loss function—its unconditional
expectation—which is what we report.17 (Thus the
14 Issues involving determinacy of this solution, and others considered
below, are considered by Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Svensson and
Woodford (2004). More fundamental, in our opinion, is the learnability
of various solutions, also discussed by Bullard and Mitra. In that regard,
Evans and Honkapohja (2003) have shown that the solution (13)-(14)
is learnable if an appropriate interest rate rule is used to implement
the optimality condition (8), but is not learnable for some other modes
of implementation. Similar results apply to other solutions discussed
below.
15 The recent results of Blake (2001) indicate that such a claim would
be incorrect, although the contrary cases involve unusually low values
of α/ω and β.
16 A few quantitative results have previously been reported by Giannoni
(2000), Vestin (2000), Woodford (1999), and Walsh (2003), but without
the type of systematic exploration provided here.
17 Here we follow the example of King and Wolman (1999), Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), and Walsh
(2003) in our use of the unconditional expectation of (3) as the policy
criterion.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS McCallum and Nelson
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unconditional expectation of (3) equals the reported
values multiplied by 1+β+β
2+…=(1 – β)
–1.) In
what follows, these values are calculated using
asymptotic formulae for the moments of the vari-
ables in the model (e.g., Hamilton, 1994, p. 265).18
We use our modification of the QZ algorithm of
Klein (2000) to obtain the MSV solution.
Results for the Basic Model
Table 1 reports values of the loss function for a
range of α and ω values, with β kept at 0.99 through-
out. For α, we suggest that actual values probably
lie between 0.01 and 0.05; see, e.g., the estimates
in Galí and Gertler (1999). For the central bank
preference parameter ω, our range of 0.001 to 0.1
includes values that place almost all weight on infla-
tion variability and values that give much weight to
output gap variability. Since we are using quarter-
year time periods, equal weights in terms of annual-
ized inflation (as in the original Taylor rule) imply
ω=(1/4)
2=0.0625. The standard deviation of the
white noise ut shocks is taken to be 0.005 (i.e., 0.5
percent).19 Thus the annualized standard deviation
is about 2 percent, slightly less than is realistic for
the U.S. economy. In each entry of Table 1 there are
two numbers; the first is the average (i.e., uncondi-
tional expectation) loss for the timeless-perspective
(TP) solution, and the second is for the discretionary
(DIS) solution. From the table it can be seen that
the TP policy produces smaller losses than the DIS
policy for all examined values of α and ω. The
quantitative extent of the difference is about 15 to
20 percent for most values in the table, but falls to
a magnitude as low as 2 percent.
What, if anything, can be said about the absolute
levels of these loss magnitudes? Clearly it is possible
to compare them to the costs of a steady, maintained
inflation. Suppose that inflation is kept constantly
at a rate that exceeds the target rate by 1 percent
per year. That implies πt=0.01/4=0.0025, so with
yt kept at zero, the value of the period loss becomes
0.0025
2=0.63 × 10
–5. Thus the TP and DIS losses
in Table 1 with α=0.05 and ω=0.01, for example,
are about 2.4 and 3.2 times as large as the cost of an
inflation rate that exceeds the target by 1.0 percent
per year. Translating the inflation cost into equivalent
consumption terms would be highly problematic,
since the results depend sensitively upon the precise
shape of the money demand function in the vicinity
of the target inflation rate. This problem would
remain even if we were to assume that the central
bank loss function were based on the utility function
of individual agents.
Results for the Basic Model with
Serially Correlated Shocks
To consider whether these results are robust,
we modify the model somewhat. In particular, we
now assume that the ut shock process is serially
correlated according to a first-order autoregressive
specification with an autoregression parameter value
of 0.8. This change does not affect the TP and DIS
rules for the basic model, but will result in solution
processes for inflation and the output gap that fea-
ture considerable persistence, much more like actual
data than those generated by the basic model with
white noise ut shocks. We retain a value of 0.005 for
the standard deviation of ut by reducing the inno-
vation variance by a factor of [1/(1 – 0.8
2)]=2.778.
Results are shown in Table 2.
A greater percentage difference now holds in
the TP and DIS outcomes for most α and ω values.
The ratios of DIS to TP losses, that is, are somewhat
18 These values have been checked by comparison with averages of the
same statistics across 100 stochastic simulations (200 periods).
19 The value chosen for this standard deviation directly influences the
values of calculated losses, but does not influence the relative mag-
nitudes of the losses under TP and discretionary policies.
Losses with TP and DIS Policy Behavior, Basic NKPC
(Reported values are losses times 10
5, TP/DIS)
Value of ω
Value of α 0.001 0.01 0.0625 0.10 
0.10 0.21/0.23 0.96/1.25 1.69/2.16 1.84/2.27 
0.05 0.59/0.71 1.54/2.00 2.07/2.40 2.15/2.44 
0.01 1.84/2.27 2.28/2.48 2.43/2.50 2.45/2.50 
Table 1
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larger than in the case with white noise shocks. This
is not too surprising, for the fundamental advantage
of the TP rule is that it takes correct account of private
sector expectations and, therefore, of intertemporal
aspects of the situation, which are more pronounced
when serial correlation of the shocks is included.
Alternative Model
An alternative specification that also tends to
generate persistence in inflation, and consequently
has been prominent in recent research, is provided
by replacement of price-adjustment relation (1)
with the following:
(17) 
πt=αyt+βθEtπt+1+β(1 – θ)πt –1+ut.          0<θ<1
Relations of this general type have been pro-
moted by Fuhrer (1997), among others, and are
considered in the rule analysis of CGG (1999), Jensen
(2002), and Walsh (2003). To find the TP policy rule
with (17) replacing (1), we follow the procedure out-
lined earlier and obtain the following first-order
conditions in place of (5)20:
(18a)            2ωyt+αλt=0          t=1, 2, … 
(18b)
2πt+ θλt –1 – λt+β
2(1 – θ)Etλt+1=0          t=2, 3, …
(18c)                2π1 –λ1+β
2(1 – θ)λ2=0. 
Adopting the Woodford-CGG timeless perspective
approach, by substituting out the λt multipliers
between (18a) and (18b), yields the optimality 
condition
(19)
πt=(ω/α)[θyt –1 – yt+β
2(1 – θ)Etyt+1].      t=1, 2, … 
Here, Etyt+1 appears instead of yt+1, because the
latter is not known at t.
For the case of discretionary optimization, there
are actually two possible concepts. First, one might
conceive of the central bank as implementing (18a)
and (18c) in period 1 and planning to implement
(18a) and (18b) in each subsequent period. When
period 2 arrives, however, the central bank re-solves
its problem and again implements (18a) and (18c),
now updated to period 2. Indeed, in this case the
central bank re-solves and implements this solution
in each period. With Lagrange multipliers substituted
out, the relevant optimality condition is 
(20)         πt= –(ω/α)[yt – β
2(1 – θ)Etyt+1], 
where again it is recognized that yt+1 is not known
in period t. The second concept, used by CGG (1999,
p. 1692) and Jensen (2002), does not involve the
dynamic inconsistency that is clearly implied by
the first. Instead of planning to implement (18b) in
future periods, the central bank recognizes in period
1 that in period 2 it will behave just as it does in
period 1. Therefore, in minimizing (3), E1π2 in the
constraint (17) for period 1 will be replaced with
ρ1π1, where ρ1 is a parameter of the equilibrium
solution expression πt=ρ1πt –1+ρ2ut. In the present
case with white noise ut, the relevant optimality
condition with this conception of discretionary
behavior is 
(21)   πt=–(ω/α)[(1 – βθρ1)yt – β
2(1 – θ)Etyt+1]. 
Thus there is a smaller responsiveness of inflation
(and a larger responsiveness of output) to shocks
than would be present if policy behavior were as
implied by (20). Since (21) evidently reflects a more
20 In general, changing the Phillips curve specification means that the
loss function (3) can no longer be obtained directly from an approxi-
mation of household utility.  For example, Steinsson (2003) shows that
a Phillips curve like equation (17) implies that the period loss function
is no longer time-separable.  Following CGG and Jensen, we neglect
this nonseparability and continue to use (3) as our welfare criterion.
Losses with TP and DIS Policy Behavior, NKPC with ρu = 0.8
(Reported values are losses times 10
5, TP/DIS)
Value of ω
Value of α 0.001 0.01 0.0625 0.10 
0.10 0.24/0.26 0.98/3.43 7.89/21.4 10.6/29.9 
0.05 0.89/1.19 5.82/14.9 17.3/42.3 21.4/47.2 
0.01 10.6/29.9 29.9/53.1 45.2/57.0 48.2/57.3 
Table 2
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standard version of discretion than (20), it will be
used in what follows.21
Results are reported in Table 3 for the case in
which (17) describes price adjustment behavior, with
θ=0.5, when ut is white noise. Here the ratio of DIS
losses to TP losses is somewhat larger than in Table 1
for the lower right-hand cells but smaller elsewhere.
In all cases covered by our α and ω values, the TP
losses are smaller than the DIS losses. The table
therefore establishes, for a wide range of parameter
choices, that the superiority of TP over DIS policies
is robust to allowing for intrinsic persistence in
inflation.
TARGET RULES AND INSTRUMENT
RULES
A monetary policy that implemented the opti-
mality conditions studied above would correspond
to following what Svensson (1997, 1999) terms
“targeting rules,” as distinct from “instrument rules.”
In these papers, as well as others, Svensson argues
that consideration of targeting rules is preferable
for actual central banks and for policy analysis.
McCallum (1999a) and McCallum and Nelson (1999)
have, by contrast, suggested that instrument rules
are more interesting from a normative point of view.
It could also be argued that they are more relevant
empirically, in the sense that the actual inflation-
targeting regimes currently in place in New Zealand,
Canada, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere are
more satisfactorily represented by formal analytical
models with instrument rules than with target
rules.22 An important part of this argument is that
no actual central bank has revealed what its loss
function is—e.g., what its value of ω is in expression
(3). Of course an argument of this nature can never
be conclusive, but we would point out that Woodford
(1999, pp. 287-99) has presented a sophisticated
discussion that predominantly supports this position.
A strictly analytical claim made by McCallum
(1999a, p. 1493, footnote 17) is that an instrument
rule can typically be written so as to imply instru-
ment responses that would tend to bring about the
satisfaction of any (feasible) specified target rule. In
the context of the present analysis, for example, one
could include the optimizing IS relation (2) as part
of the model and then specify an instrument rule
for Rt that is designed to implement an optimality
condition such as (8). In this case, the rule could be
written as
(22)
Rt=(1 – µ2){r –+πt+µ1[πt+(ω/α)(yt – yt–1)]}+µ2Rt–1, 
which, with µ1>0, µ2 ≥ 0, is similar to an extended23
version of the Taylor (1993) rule, but with πt+
(ω/α)(yt – yt –1) rather than πt+yt as the target 
variable, i.e., the variable that the rule seeks to keep
close to some desired value. If the economy is one
in which current aggregate demand can be influ-
enced by Rt, then as µ1 is increased, the variability
of the term in square brackets in (21) tends to be
decreased, yielding an approximation to the satis-
faction of optimality condition (8).24
To determine whether it is in fact the case that
increasing µ1 values would lead to approximate
satisfaction of (8)—and likewise of the discretionary
21 We proceed computationally by assuming a value for ρ1, solving the
model conditional on that value, determining the value implied by
the solution, and iterating.  For an alternative, dynamic programming
approach to the problem, see Steinsson (2003).
22 See, for example, the discussions of the respective central bank prac-
tices given by Archer (2000), Freedman (2000), and King (1999).
23 The extension takes the form of an added Rt–1 term to reflect interest
rate smoothing.
24 This argument does not maintain that (22) is the only instrument
rule that would serve the purpose of implementing (8), but merely
that it will do so (and has been mentioned in the literature).
Losses with TP and DIS Policy Behavior, Model Including (17)
(Reported values are losses times 10
5, TP/DIS)
Value of ω
Value of α 0.001 0.01 0.0625 0.10 
0.10 0.22/0.23 1.36/1.48 3.70/4.34 4.56/5.45 
0.05 0.72/0.75 2.99/3.44 6.60/8.17 7.83/9.85 
0.01 4.56/5.45 10.6/13.7 17.7/22.6 19.7/24.6 
Table 3
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optimality condition (7)—consider the values
reported in Table 4. There, α=0.05 and µ2=0 are
retained throughout, with various values of ω spec-
ified and µ1 increased from the Taylor value 0.5 to
extremely large magnitudes.25 The shock term in
relation (2) includes two components, a white noise
taste component with standard deviation 0.02 and
also y –
t – Et y –
t+1, where the natural-rate value y –
t
comes from an AR(1) process with AR parameter
0.95 and innovation standard deviation 0.007.26
The results indicate that, at least for this example,27
the instrument rule approximates very closely the
target-rule optimality conditions for large µ1 values
(strong feedback responses). With µ1 ≥50, for exam-
ple, the ω=0.0625 case gives TP and DIS loss values
of 2.09 and 2.41, respectively, which are essentially
identical to the target-rule losses shown in Table 1.
Thus, instrument rules can be written to include
target rules as extreme special cases, but are more
general.28
OPERATIONALITY
Exercises such as those of the preceding sections
are interesting and even enlightening, but are far
removed from the monetary policy problems facing
actual central bankers. In reality, decisionmakers at
central banks have only vague notions about the
“true model”—i.e., the workings of the actual econ-
omy—and have highly incomplete and imperfect
information regarding current values of many vari-
ables of macroeconomic importance. Serious studies
of desirable policy should recognize these features
of reality. We now wish to determine how such
operationality considerations are related to the issues
regarding optimality in forward-looking models that
have been considered here. Clearly, a complete study
is beyond the scope of this paper, but some leading
problems can be considered. First we consider two
particular points, ones that have been stressed in
previous work by McCallum and Nelson (1999) and
McCallum (1999a). 
The first point is the central bank’s lack of
knowledge of the current value of output at the time
it sets its interest rate instrument for that period.
To be more realistic, one could include the most
recent period’s value yt–1, but a preferable approach
would be to use Et–1yt. Accordingly, we now inves-
tigate the effects of including Et–1yt in place of yt in
instrument rule simulations such as those used
earlier. In addition, we consider cases in which
current inflation is not observed, so that Et–1πt is
used by the central bank in place of πt, and in which
neither of these variables is observed.
A first set of results is shown in Table 5, where
the first row repeats results from Table 4 for com-
parison. The second row gives the results with the
expected current output gap included in place of
the (unobserved) current value. It will be seen that
the magnitude of the losses seen in the table is, in
this case, much greater than with full information,
with the extent of the increase positively related to
ω (i.e., to the strength of the response to the imper-
fectly observed gap variable). For each ω value con-
25 We are using relation (1) with a white noise shock term.
26 This component must be included because the IS equation (2) is
written in terms of the output gap.
27 Similar results have also been obtained for the case where the shock
term in (1) is AR(1) with parameter 0.8.
28 It has been suggested that large values of µ1 would induce excessive
volatility of the Rt instrument, but such an outcome will not obtain if
these large values keep the variability of πt and yt low. Our results
indicate that, in fact, the latter case prevails.
Losses with Interest Instrument Versions of TP and DIS
Behavior, Basic NKPC Model with α = 0.05 and µ2 = 0
(Reported values are losses times 10
5, TP/DIS)
Value of ω
Value of µ1 0.001 0.01 0.0625 0.10 
0.5 2.51/2.51 2.90/2.86 5.29/4.20 7.36/4.69 
5.0 2.12/2.14 2.45/2.43 3.38/2.63 3.40/2.62 
50.0 0.86/1.04 1.58/2.03 2.09/2.41 2.17/2.44 
500.0 0.59/0.72 1.54/2.00 2.07/2.40 2.16/2.44 
Table 4
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sidered, it remains true that the TP losses are smaller
than the DIS losses. In the third row, we suppose
that inflation (instead of output) is currently unob-
servable. In this case, the losses are essentially equal
for all ω values and for both TP and DIS policies.
The value of the loss function, moreover, is very
nearly equal to the value of the variance of the ut
shock term.
In the fourth row, we suppose that both inflation
and output are currently unobservable. In this case,
the TP losses jump up drastically while the DIS
losses increase, but by much less. It is understand-
able that losses could be very large in this case, for
the setup is one in which policy is in effect trying
to stabilize current variables although they are not
observable. In the discretionary case, certainty
equivalence implies that the attempt at stabilization
is being carried out as efficiently as possible when
t – 1 expectations are used in the rule in the absence
of current observations (see Svensson and Woodford,
2003), but this principle does not carry over directly
to the TP case. In that case, it turns out that inclusion
of Et–1πt+1, Et–1yt+1, and Et–1yt yields much better
results. In fact, those results, shown in the fifth row
of Table 5, are equivalent to those given in the fourth-
row DIS cases.
A second set of results, pertaining to the case
in which the price adjustment relation (17) replaces
(1), is given in Table 6. Qualitatively, the results are
not too different from those of Table 5. In particular,
when neither πt nor yt is currently observable, the
TP performance is poor. But it can be improved by
shifting forward the dates of each variable (whose
values are those expected on the basis of t – 1 data).
TP and DIS Losses with Unobservable Output
Basic Model with α = 0.05, µ1 = 50, and µ2 = 0
(Reported values are losses times 10
5, TP/DIS)
Value of ω
0.001 0.01 0.0625 0.10
With yt and πt in  rule  0.86/1.04 1.58/2.03 2.09/2.41 2.17/2.44 
With Et –1yt and πt in  rule  0.74/0.90 3.21/3.29 12.0/17.2 16.1/27.1 
With yt and Et –1πt in  rule  2.62/2.57 2.58/2.52 2.53/2.50 2.52/2.50 
With Et –1yt and Et –1πt in rule  2.77/2.64  12.5/3.00  185.6/5.10  31,220/6.60 
With Et –1yt+1, Et –1yt, and Et –1πt+1 in  rule  2.64/2.64 3.00/3.00 5.10/5.10 6.60/6.60 
Table 5
TP and DIS Losses with Unobservable Output
Model Including (17) with α = 0.05, µ1 = 50, and µ2 = 0
(Reported values are losses times 10
5, TP/DIS)
Value of ω
0.001 0.01 0.0625 0.10 
With Etyt+1, yt, and πt in rule  1.03/1.11  3.05/3.58  6.60/8.24  7.84/9.88 
With Et –1yt+1, Et –1yt, and πt in rule  0.90/0.99  4.58/4.56  28.3/25.0  44.5/39.7 
With Etyt+1, yt , and Et –1πt in rule  2.31/2.41  3.92/4.41  7.06/8.59  8.20/10.2 
With Et –1yt+1, Et –1yt, and Et –1πt in rule  2.22/2.35  4.39/4.58  25.3/11.0  51.2/14.2 
With Et –1yt+2, Et –1yt+1, and Et –1πt+1 in rule  2.89/3.12  3.39/4.36  8.47/17.3  11.0/26.4 
NOTE: yt–1 appears in all the TP rules except those of the last row, where it is replaced by Et–1yt.
Table 6
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Indeed, in this case, the TP results are superior to
those based on the DIS procedure, instead of being
equal as in Table 5.
Our second point of concern is arguably of
even greater practical importance. It involves the
unobservability of the natural-rate level of output
that goes into the central bank’s measure of the
output gap. In this case the nature of the problem
is quite different, we contend. Rather than reflecting
merely a lack of current information, the problem
is largely conceptual—that is, it stems from the
existence of various different concepts of the relevant
reference value (which we have been calling “natural
rate”). That there are several distinct concepts in use
is implicit in the terms used by different researchers
and practitioners. In addition to the term “potential,”
which is frequently used by practitioners, there are
the words “trend,” “capacity,” “NAIRU,” “market
clearing,” and “flexible price,” besides “natural rate.”
There are perhaps fewer distinct concepts than
terms, but there seem to be at least three fundamen-
tally different ones: trend, NAIRU, and flexible-price
concepts. And, of course, there are many ways of
measuring trend output that are quite different in
their effects. Furthermore, since reliance on any
particular concept will be maintained over time,
differences will not possess the orthogonality prop-
erties of pure “noise.” 
Which of the concepts is most appropriate
theoretically? From the perspective of dynamic,
optimizing analysis, the answer is the third of the
three just listed, the flexible-price concept—that is,
the output level that would prevail in the absence
of nominal price stickiness. There have been very
few attempts to implement this type of measure
empirically, but there is one in McCallum and Nelson
(1999), which we briefly review.
This procedure begins with the assumption that
output is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas
production function relating the log of output lin-
early to the logs of labor and capital (nt and kt), a
deterministic trend, and a shock term at reflecting
the stochastic component of technological change.
Then, since kt and at are given in t whether or not
prices are flexible, the difference between the logs
of actual and flexible-price output (i.e., the output
gap) will be proportional to the difference between
actual and flexible-price labor input, nt – n –
t. For
simplicity, McCallum and Nelson (1999) assumed
that the flexible-price level n –
t (per period, per person)
is a constant and, numerically, they measured nt for
the United States, 1955:Q1–1996:Q4, as total man-
hours employed in nonagricultural private industry
divided by the civilian labor force. This measure is
scaled so that the average value of nt – n –
t equals
zero. The necessity of that step is undesirable, but
on the positive side there is no deterministic trend
in the resulting nt – n –
t series. Then, using 0.7 as the
elasticity of output with respect to labor, they con-
structed a series for the output gap yt (shown in
McCallum and Nelson, 1999, p. 28) and contrasted
with a measure based on simple log-linear detrend-
ing. This series, in combination with the correspon-
ding output series, provides a series for y –
t.29 It has
approximately the time series properties assumed
above.
An important point is that non-zero realizations
of the technology shock at affect the McCallum-
Nelson measure of y –
t one-for-one, whereas many
detrending procedures, used extensively by aca-
demics and to some extent by central banks, remove
at almost entirely from each period’s measure of
y –
t. The same is true, furthermore, for many NAIRU-
based procedures. So the question at hand is whether
this conceptual discrepancy is of quantitative impor-
tance—whether the use of a mistaken concept would
create major welfare losses from policy rules that
rely upon measures of the output gap. We approach
this question here by assuming that the McCallum
and Nelson (1999) measure of the gap is correct, but
that the central bank incorrectly uses the measure
based on linear detrending in the context of instru-
ment rule (22). For simplicity, we assume that the
central bank has accurate knowledge of the true
trend, which is excessively optimistic, so the con-
ceptual error as implemented is only that the central
bank neglects the influence of at on y –
t.
Results are reported in Table 7. The loss values
reported there can be compared with those in
Table 4, in which the experiment is the same except
for the postulated mis-measurement of y –
t. It is
clear that the consequences of the conceptual
error are quite substantial, except for ω=0.001,
and are much larger for large values of ω. Because
these values imply giving more weight to the output
gap, the results are consistent with the suggestion
of McCallum (1999a) and Orphanides (2003) that it
is dangerous to respond strongly to measures of
the output gap. Furthermore, Table 7 indicates that
the TP outcomes are considerably more desirable
29 Galí and Gertler (1999) also use labor market data, in a different but
related manner, in the context of estimating the Calvo specification
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than those resulting from DIS behavior. This result
is in keeping with the spirit of the suggestions of
McCallum (1999a), Orphanides (2003), and Jensen
(2002) that responding to some variable reflecting
nominal income growth may be more attractive
than responding to the level of the output gap.
INFLATIONARY BIAS 
An issue of obvious interest is how the magni-
tudes of the losses shown in Tables 1 through 7
compare with those implied by the discretionary
inflationary bias discussed in the enormous litera-
ture that uses non-forward-looking models. The
inflationary bias carries over to the forward-looking
models, as Woodford (1999) and CGG (1999) have
pointed out, if the central bank’s objective function
includes terms such as πt
2+ω(yt – k)
2, with k>0,
reflecting a desire by the central bank to keep out-
put above the natural-rate value that would obtain
on average in the absence of nominal frictions (i.e.,
with fully flexible prices). In the model at hand, the
magnitude of the bias is simply (ω/α)k, as can be
easily verified. To get a clear idea of the magnitudes
involved, let us then suppose that k=0.01, i.e., that
the central bank aims for a level of output that
exceeds the natural-rate value by 1 percent. Then
if ω/α=1, the bias would be 0.01 and its square,
0.0001, would be appropriate for comparison with
the values in Tables 1, 4, and 5.30 Those tables’
entries are losses multiplied by 10
5, of course, so in
this case the loss value comparable to the first-row/
fourth-column entries of Table 1 would be 10. More
generally, we have the values reported in Table 8,
where for values of ω equal to or greater than 0.0625
the inflationary bias is more important, if relevant,
than the newly emphasized dynamic loss.
It is, of course, not clear that actual central banks
behave as if k exceeds zero, i.e., behave so as to aim
for an output rate higher than the flexible-price
(natural rate) value. The position that intelligent
central banks do not aim for higher output values
has been advanced by Svensson (1999), King (1996),
and others. It nevertheless seems possible to us that
positive values of k might well reflect the behavior
of some actual central banks, even ones with well-
30 For the exercises reported in these tables, the standard deviation of
ut is, we think, fairly realistically calibrated.
DIS Losses due to Inflation Bias
Basic Model 
(Reported values are losses times 10
5)
Value of ω
Value of α 0.001 0.01 0.0625 0.10 
0.10 0.001 0.10 3.91 10.0
0.05 0.004 0.40 15.6 40.0
0.01 0.10 10.0 391 1,000.0
Table 8
Losses from Responding to Incorrect Concept for Potential Output
(Reported values are losses times 10
5, TP/DIS)
Value of ω
Value of µ1 0.001 0.01 0.0625 0.10 
0.5 4.09/4.31 4.37/6.67 6.11/18.8 7.75/24.8
5.0 2.13/2.21 2.42/3.98 4.00/16.5 4.93/22.7
50.0 0.86/1.06 1.63/3.38 3.11/16.2 4.15/22.5
500.0 0.59/0.74 1.61/3.33 3.12/16.2 4.17.22.5
Table 7
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informed and inflation-averse leaders. The reason
is that k>0 would be a feature of central bank
preferences that accord with a welfare criterion
based on household utility when factors such as
monopolistic competition or tax distortions, which
imply that the flexible-price competitive equilibrium
is not socially optimal, are present (see Woodford,
2003). Of course, central banks may regard it as
more appropriate to respond to these real distortions
using devices other than monetary policy; this,
indeed, is the assumption in many recent analyses
of optimal monetary policy (including Woodford,
2003, and Aoki, 2001). In any event, knowledge of
the relative importance of this bias is relevant for
the strategic decisions of central banks. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We began this analysis by reviewing the distinc-
tion between the timeless perspective and discre-
tionary modes of monetary policymaking, the former
representing rule-based policy as formalized by
Woodford (1999). This distinction becomes impor-
tant in models with forward-looking expectations,
a model feature that was not typically used in the
rules-vs.-discretion literature. Typically, there is a
second inefficiency from discretionary policymaking,
distinct from the more familiar inflationary bias. We
calculated the quantitative magnitude of this second
inefficiency or loss, using calibrated models of two
types prominent in the current literature and a wide
range of values representing the relative seriousness
of inflation and output-gap variability. The magni-
tude of the losses is significant, and greater in some
(but not all) cases than the inflationary bias arising
from a 1 percent excess of the central bank’s output
target over the natural-rate value.  The losses tend
to be somewhat larger in model specifications that
imply inflation rate persistence and are often (but
not universally) larger with more objective-function
weight on output-gap variability.
In addition, we have examined the distinction
between instrument rules and targeting rules; our
results indicate that targeting-rule outcomes can
be closely approximated by instrument rules that
respond to any failure of the targeting rule’s opti-
mality condition to hold. Using the instrument rule
formulation, we briefly investigated operationality
issues, involving the unobservability of current out-
put and perhaps inflation. In addition, we examined
a set of cases that assume that the monetary policy-
maker is using the wrong concept of the natural-
rate or potential level of output. In almost all of the
various cases examined in the paper, the perform-
ance of timeless-perspective policymaking is at least
as good as that provided by optimal discretionary
behavior. Furthermore, these optimal rules can be
well approximated by simple feedback rules based
on an interest rate instrument.
REFERENCES
Aoki, Kosuke. “Optimal Monetary Policy Responses to
Relative-Price Changes.” Journal of Monetary Economics,
August 2001, 48(1), pp. 55-80.
Archer, David J. “Inflation Targeting in New Zealand.” Paper
presented at the IMF Institute Seminar on Inflation
Targeting, Washington, DC, March 20-21, 2000.
Barro, Robert J. and Gordon, David B. “A Positive Theory of
Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model.” Journal of
Political Economy, August 1983, 91(4), pp. 589-610.
Batini, Nicoletta and Nelson, Edward. “Optimal Horizons
for Inflation Targeting.” Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, June/July 2001, 25(6-7), pp. 891-910.
Blake, Andrew P. “A ‘Timeless Perspective’ on Optimality in
Forward-Looking Rational Expectations Models.” Working
paper, National Institute of Economic and Social Research,
London, 2001.
Bullard, James and Mitra, Kaushik. “Learning About Monetary
Policy Rules.” Journal of Monetary Economics, September
2002, 49(6), pp. 1105-29.
Clarida, Richard; Galí, Jordi and Gertler, Mark. “The Science
of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective.” Journal
of Economic Literature, December 1999, 37(4), pp. 1661-
707.
Currie, David and Levine, Paul. Rules, Reputation, and
Macroeconomic Policy Coordination. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993.
Erceg, Christopher J.; Henderson, Dale W. and Levin,
Andrew T. “Optimal Monetary Policy with Staggered Wage
and Price Contracts.” Journal of Monetary Economics,
October 2000, 46(2), pp. 281-313.
Evans, George W. and Honkapohja, Seppo. “Monetary Policy,
Expectations, and Commitment.” Working paper,
University of Oregon, April 2003.
Freedman, Charles. “The Canadian Experience with Targets
 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS McCallum and Nelson
MARCH/APRIL 2004      55
for Reducing and Controlling Inflation.” Paper presented
at IMF Institute Seminar on Inflation Targeting,
Washington, DC, March 20-21, 2000.
Fuhrer, Jeffrey C. “The (Un)Importance of Forward-Looking
Behavior in Price Specifications.” Journal of Money, Credit,
and Banking, August 1997, 29(3), pp. 338-50.
Galí, Jordi and Gertler, Mark. “Inflation Dynamics: A Structural
Econometric Analysis.” Journal of Monetary Economics,
October 1999, 44(2), pp. 195-222.
Giannoni, Marc P. “Optimal Interest-Rate Rules in a Forward-
Looking Model, and Inflation Stabilization versus Price-
Level Stabilization.” Unpublished manuscript, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, September 2000. 
Hamilton, James D. Time Series Analysis. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994.
Jensen, Christian. “Optimal Monetary Policy in Forward-
Looking Models with Rational Expectations.” Working
paper, Carnegie Mellon University, 2001.
Jensen, Christian and McCallum, Bennett T. “The Non-
Optimality of Proposed Monetary Policy Rules under
Timeless-Perspective Commitment.” Economics Letters,
October 2002, 77(2), pp. 163-68.
Jensen, Henrik. “Targeting Nominal Income Growth or
Inflation?” American Economic Review, September 2002,
92(4), pp. 928-56.
King, Mervyn A. “How Should Central Banks Reduce
Inflation?—Conceptual Issues,” in Achieving Price Stability:
A Symposium Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1996,
pp. 53-91.
King, Mervyn A. “The MPC Two Years On.” Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin, August 1999, 39(3), pp. 297-303. 
King, Robert G. and Wolman, Alexander L. “What Should
the Monetary Authority Do When Prices Are Sticky?” in
John B. Taylor, ed., Monetary Policy Rules. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1999, pp. 349-98.
Klein, Paul. “Using the Generalized Schur Form to Solve a
Multivariate Linear Rational Expectations Model.” Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, September 2000,
24(10), pp. 1405-23.
Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward C. “Rules Rather
than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans.”
Journal of Political Economy, June 1977, 85(3), pp. 473-91.
Kydland, Finn E. and Prescott, Edward C. “Dynamic Optimal
Taxation, Rational Expectations, and Optimal Control.”
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, February 1980,
2(1), pp. 79-91.
Lucas, Robert E. Jr. “Rules, Discretion, and the Role of the
Economic Advisor,” in Stanley Fischer, ed., Rational
Expectations and Economic Policy. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1980, pp. 199-210.
McCallum, Bennett T. “Issues in the Design of Monetary
Policy Rules,” in John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford,
eds., Handbook of Macroeconomics, Volume 1C.
Amsterdam: North Holland, 1999a, pp. 1483-530.
McCallum, Bennett T. “Role of the Minimal State Variable
Criterion in Rational Expectations Models.” International
Tax and Public Finance, November 1999b, 6(4), pp. 621-39.
McCallum, Bennett T. and Nelson, Edward. “Performance
of Operational Policy Rules in an Estimated Semi-Classical
Structural Model,” in John B. Taylor, ed., Monetary Policy
Rules. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, pp.
15-45.
Orphanides, Athanasios. “The Quest for Prosperity without
Inflation.” Journal of Monetary Economics, April 2003,
50(3), pp. 633-63.
Rotemberg, Julio J. and Woodford, Michael. “Interest Rate
Rules in an Estimated Sticky Price Model,” in John B.
Taylor, ed., Monetary Policy Rules. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1999, pp. 57-119.
Rudebusch, Glenn D. and Svensson, Lars E.O. “Policy Rules
for Inflation Targeting,” in John B. Taylor, ed., Monetary
Policy Rules. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999,
pp. 203-46.
Steinsson, Jón. “Optimal Monetary Policy in an Economy
with Inflation Persistence.” Journal of Monetary Economics,
October 2003, 50(7), pp. 1425-56.
Svensson, Lars E.O. “Inflation Forecast Targeting:
Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets.” European
Economic Review, June 1997, 41(6), pp. 1111–46.
Svensson, Lars E.O. “Inflation Targeting as a Monetary
 McCallum and Nelson REVIEW
56 MARCH/APRIL 2004
Policy Rule.” Journal of Monetary Economics, June 1999,
43(3), pp. 607-54.
Svensson, Lars E.O. and Woodford, Michael. “Indicator
Variables for Optimal Policy.” Journal of Monetary
Economics, April 2003, 50(3), pp. 691-720.
Svensson, Lars E.O. and Woodford, Michael. “Implementing
Optimal Policy through Inflation-Forecast Targeting,”
forthcoming in Ben S. Bernanke and Michael Woodford,
eds., Inflation Targeting. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2004.
Taylor, John B. “Estimation and Control of a Macroeconomic
Model with Rational Expectations.” Econometrica,
September 1979, 47(5), pp. 1267-86.
Taylor, John B. “Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice.”
Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, December
1993, 39(1), pp. 195-214.
Vestin, David. “Price-Level Targeting Versus Inflation
Targeting in a Forward-Looking Model.” Working Paper
No. 106, Swedish Riksbank, May 2000.
Walsh, Carl E. “Speed Limit Policies: The Output Gap and
Optimal Monetary Policy.” American Economic Review,
March 2003, 93(1), pp. 265-78.
Woodford, Michael. “Commentary: How Should Monetary
Policy Be Conducted in an Era of Price Stability?” in New
Challenges for Monetary Policy: A Symposium Sponsored
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1999, pp. 277-316.
Woodford, Michael. “Pitfalls of Forward-Looking Monetary
Policy.” American Economic Review (Papers and
Proceedings), May 2000, 90(2), pp. 100-04.
Woodford, Michael. Interest and Prices: Foundations of a
Theory of Monetary Policy. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2003.
 